There you go: http://www.mybll.net/vyos-1.2.0-rolling+201808230337-amd64.iso
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Sep 11 2018
Sep 10 2018
Sep 7 2018
After a successfull connection I see the spawned process:
root 2595 0.0 0.0 4332 124 pts/1 Ss+ 22:58 0:00 /usr/sbin/xl2tpd root 2868 0.5 0.2 26108 2484 pts/1 S+ 22:59 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/pppd passive nodetach 10.255.255.0:172.16.222.1 refuse-pap auth name VyattaL2TPServer debug file /etc/ppp/options.xl2tpd /dev/pts/1
Okay, I narrowed it down even further:
Thanks! Sounds like a proper fix to me.
Sep 6 2018
I‘m using VyOS 1.2.x wirh a 4GB HDD on ESXi
Issue was introduced between those two images:
Sep 5 2018
I guess then it was "broken" all the time
Does downstreaming work when you configure set system ntp allow-clients address?
Sep 4 2018
Sep 3 2018
@dmbaturin the "workaround" and implementation is IMHO super bad (https://github.com/vyos/vyos-1x/blob/current/src/conf_mode/snmp.py#L808-L813) as it uses /opt/vyatta/sbin/my_set or /opt/vyatta/sbin/my_delete.
Yes, just pass the variable on calls to os.system()
Sep 2 2018
Sep 1 2018
cpo@LR1:~$ cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW
Even happens without any argument:
cpo@LR1# sudo /usr/sbin/lldpd -d 2018-09-01T20:12:53 [WARN/lldpctl] unknown command from argument 1: `#` 2018-09-01T20:12:53 [WARN/lldpctl] unknown command from argument 1: `#`
Happens too when started by hand, where 172.16.254.35 is the management address
The user/password thing is closed. The Port issue seems to not be easy. Will be easier with a vyos-1x rewrite
IPv6 DHCP
Just tried your configuration and adopted it to my LAB. I can't reproduce your issue.
Done!
I had the exact same problem for the service broadcast-relay code. I did a cleanup on the youthful folly. Resulting in this issue going away (https://github.com/vyos/vyos-1x/commit/fd1eabe72862ec364643a61cb94b21c330a385f5#diff-e27a1d5bf8f371aae9da8bbd36e674d0).
snaplen (-L) [GLOBAL, NO_NFACCTD] Desc specifies the maximum number of bytes to capture for each packet. This directive has key importance when enabling both classification and connection tracking engines. In fact, some protocols (mostly text-based eg.: RTSP, SIP, etc.) benefit of extra bytes because they give more chances to successfully track data streams spawned by control channel. But it must be also noted that capturing larger packet portion require more resources. The right value need to be traded-off. In case classification is enabled, values under 200 bytes are often meaningless. 500-750 bytes are enough even for text based protocols. Default snaplen values are ok if classification is disabled. For uacctd daemon, this option doesn't apply to packet snapshot length but rather to the Netlink socket read buffer size. This should be reasonably large - at least 4KB, which is the default value. For large uacctd_nl_size values snaplen could be further increased.
It just died with this log:
You could also alter the file /etc/default/uacctd and add -d into DAEMON_OPTS and restart flow-acounting
Starting with this daemon config reduces the logging entries dramatically:
@panachoi maybe this upgrade helps
Aug 31 2018
fixed in XML/python rewrite